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1. Motivation
Nowadays, central banks in the industrialized economies typically have a man-
date to ensure price stability and in most countries to stabilize economic output.
Their preferred policy instrument in many cases is the nominal interest rate. In
the theoretical monetary literature it is often recommended that monetary pol-
icy should be rule-based. Therefore, monetary policy rules still appear to be a
popular subject to study.
Advocates of rule-based monetary policy such as Clarida et al. (1999), Wood-
ford (2003) and Gal´ı (2008) among others provide theoretical justifications for the
use of rules in the conduct of monetary policy. The core argument is that such
rules may provide a nominal anchor for the economy, meaning that the central
bank can control nominal variables such as inflation in a way that is beneficial
for individual welfare. Controlling nominal variables is a desideratum of any
monetary policy rule. The reason is that the common transversality conditions
in macroeconomic models solely rule out explosions of real variables, but not of
nominal variables. Recently Cochrane (2007) has reemphasized this issue.1
Our analysis focuses on simple monetary policy rules, also known as Taylor
(1993)-type rules. A key characteristic of these rules is that the policy instrument
of the central bank is a linear function of (expected) inflation and (expected) out-
put gap. The monetary policy coefficients, which premultiply these two variables
of interest, express the magnitude of response to deviations in the two variables
from a certain policy target. In addition, such rules offer the advantage that
1Note that the main point of Cochrane (2007) is a serious criticism of the theories
that make the case for rule-based monetary policies in general. He has initialized
a vivid debate on the benefit of conducting monetary policy by the help of rules in
forward-looking economies that has been joined by McCallum (2009b). This debate is
still in progress and is not the focus of this study.
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a central bank can obviously relate its mandate to its policy instrument, which
increases policy transparency.
Numerous variants of rules have been proposed and their dynamic properties
have been assessed. Thus, it is quite astonishing that these assessments are com-
monly conducted under the assumption of homogeneous expectations of agents.
Usually these studies embed the rules into a New Keynesian (NK) model, where
it is routinely assumed that agents have homogeneous rational expectations (RE).
Then authors ask, whether a specific rule can yield local determinacy, i.e. there
exists a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE).2 In addition,
authors often conduct a robustness-check and assume that agents may not have
RE but learn adaptively and ask whether the REE is expectational stable.3
A widely-cited analysis of Taylor-type rules is Bullard and Mitra (2002), who
examine the rules with regard to determinacy and E-stability.4 They find that the
Taylor-type rules are relatively good tools to enforce determinacy and E-stability
for a large fraction of the considered monetary policy parameter space. Most
important, they find that a rule featuring contemporaneous expectations instead
of current values yields the same results and is highly desirable. The latter due to
the fact that a rule with contemporaneous expectations requires the central bank
to have less information about actual economic conditions and therefore this rule
is highly operational.5
2Determinacy most importantly rules out undesirable evolutions of endogenous vari-
ables such as large fluctuations, see for example Woodford (1999, p.69).
3This approach is rigorously discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). In this
scenario, it is assumed that the homogeneous agents act as econometricians and forecast
the future development of prices and other endogenous variables.
4When an equilibrium is denoted expectational stable it is also often denoted learn-
able or it is said to have the property of E-stability. These concepts are all closely
related.
5Expectations in a monetary policy rule can be thought of as the central bank’s
forecast of a variable. It is obviously easier to use a forecast of a contemporaneous
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Overall, the results of Bullard and Mitra (2002) suggest that responding more
than one-for-one to inflation, i.e. sticking to the Taylor-principle6, and respond-
ing modestly to output gap deviations is a rather good policy independent of
the particular rule. In the related analysis Bullard and Mitra (2007), the rules
have the additional feature of policy inertia.7 It turns out that policy inertia
can make determinacy even more likely and in turn reduce the threats of local
indeterminacy or explosiveness.8
A potential shortcoming of the aforementioned analyses is the fact that all
assume homogeneity of agents in the economy, despite the fact that heterogeneity
is a universal feature in reality. Heterogeneity, if captured by structural parame-
ters, can have an impact on the dynamics of an economy and affect the dynamic
properties of rules. We focus on heterogeneity of expectations in the economy.
Agents form either RE or adaptive expectations. In particular, we focus on het-
erogeneous expectations in a NK model as elaborated in Branch and McGough
(2009). We examine the consequences for local stability when the central bank
conducts monetary policy by several simple rules. Thus, the analysis herein may
be viewed as a kind of robustness-check for the numerical results of Bullard and
Mitra (2002, 2007) mentioned above.
It is important to acknowledge that we are not the first to conduct that kind
aggregate variable than to correctly observe it, as mentioned by Bullard and Mitra
(2002, p.1112) and emphasized by McCallum (1999).
6Taylor (1993) suggests such a simple interest rate rule and assumes an inflation
coefficient of 1.5, i.e. if inflation deviates from its target level, then the central bank
should react with the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one, in this case one-
and-a-half-for-one. In Taylor (1999) he denotes this suggestion from 1993 (with regard
to the functional form) a ”normative recommendation”. In Taylor (1999) he explicitly
advocates an inflation coefficient larger than one in such a policy rule. This policy
stance towards inflation is denoted the “Taylor-principle” in the literature.
7Policy inertia denotes the modern central banks’ practice to alter their policy
instrument with remarkable inertia in response to economic shocks.
8Other noteworthy studies in the tradition of Bullard and Mitra (2002, 2007) are
Preston (2005) and Duffy and Xiao (2009).
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of analysis. Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.) analyze a forward-looking rule.
They find that the presence of agents with purely adaptive expectations next
to fully rational agents turns policies, which used to yield indeterminacy in the
case of RE, into policies that yield determinacy (“Result 3”). Furthermore, the
opposite is true if the non-rational agents have extrapolative expectations (“Result
4”).9 In consequence, they conclude that purely adaptive expectations may have
a stabilizing effect, whereas extrapolative expectations may have a destabilizing
effect.10 Please be aware that Branch and McGough (2009, p.10) themselves
claim that they considered other rules: “... we also checked for robustness when
monetary policy adopts rules that depend on lagged and contemporaneous data.
The qualitative results presented below are robust to the particular form of the
policy rule”. Unfortunately, no further reference is made to those alternative
rules therein.
Overall, we think that a more detailed study of alternative Taylor-type rules
in an economy with heterogeneous expectations is necessary and interesting, es-
pecially when one slightly increases the level of heterogeneity compared to Branch
and McGough (2009, p.11ff.). Thus, we analyze the rules considered in Bullard
and Mitra (2002, 2007). Our results confirm their results for some monetary
policy rules, but not for all.
In fact, the rule featuring contemporaneous expectations remains the most
desirable policy specification. There are three reasons for that. First, it does not
9Be aware that in our context non-rational expectations are always adaptive in the
sense that agents use past observations of an endogenous variable to forecast its future
value. We distinguish purely adaptive and extrapolative expectations to make clear that
the weight on the past observations is smaller than one in the former case and larger
than one in the latter case.
10We suggest to stick to a different wording with regard to stability. More precisely,
we suggest to stick to the mathematical perspective, where local explosiveness means
instability, local determinacy means stability and local indeterminacy means too much
stability and opens the door to extrinsic uncertainty.
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require to measure current period aggregate variables and therefore is operational,
as is a well-known. Second, given that the central bank sticks to the Taylor-
principle and moderately feeds back to contemporaneous expectations about the
output gap, such a rule renders the economy determinate for the whole parameter
space under consideration. Finally, this result holds, no matter if the central bank
is actually aware of the heterogeneity of expectations in the economy. In this
sense, we shed new light on the question on how important it is, that the central
bank is aware of the expectational heterogeneity when it makes its interest rate
decisions based on forecasts.
Moreover, we detect new regions of local explosiveness. In consequence,
purely adaptive expectations do not yield larger regions of determinacy in gen-
eral, whereas extrapolative expectations yield larger regions of indeterminacy in
general. This finding is at odds with the results of Branch and McGough (2009,
p.11ff.). Strickingly, policy inertia increases the regions of determinacy remark-
ably. This confirms the results of Bullard and Mitra (2007). Thus, policy inertia
remains a highly desirable ingredient of a simple monetary policy rule even in the
case of expectational heterogeneity. This insight illustrates the merit of policy
inertia.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly
describe the economic model that is the subject of our study. We also explain how
we numerically analyze the dynamic properties of rules and make some comments
on our calibration. Section 3 contains the basic analysis of the dynamic properties
of four simple monetary policy rules without and with policy inertia in a NK
model with heterogeneous expectations. Finally, Section 4 concludes and points
out directions for further research.
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2. The Approach of the Analysis
Our analysis comprises the economic environment, the methodology of nu-
merical analysis and the choice of calibration.
2.1. The Economic Environment
Building on Branch and McGough (2009), we consider a heterogeneous ex-
pectations reduced form NK economy. Within the non-policy block, the dynamic
IS curve is given by
xt = Êt{xt+1} − σ−1
(
it − Êt{pit+1}
)
(1)
and the NK Phillips Curve (NKPC) is given by
pit = βÊt{pit+1}+ λxt. (2)
In this model the aggregate output gap is denoted xt. The variable it is the
nominal interest rate set by the central bank and pit is the rate of inflation. The
parameter σ is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of private
consumption. β is the common discount factor and λ is typically a combination
of additional structural parameters.
By Êt{zt+1} we denote the heterogeneous expectations operator for any ag-
gregate variable zt+1 as specified in Branch and McGough (2009, p.3).
11 More
11Please note that Branch and McGough (2009) make use of an “axiomatic approach”
and impose some assumptions that may appear restrictive to other scholars, but are
a necessity to achieve the aggregate equations (1) and (2). Briefly, the assumptions
that may be regarded as critical are the specification of higher order beliefs and the
assumption that wealth dynamics do not matter for the evolution of aggregate variables.
For a detailed discussion of these issues we refer the reader to Branch and McGough
(2009).
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specifically, we stick to their assumption that the heterogeneous expectations
operator for any aggregate variable zt is given by
Êt{zt+1} = αE1t {zt+1}+ (1− α)E2t {zt+1}.
Thereby α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of agents that are rational and E1t {zt+1} = Et{zt+1}
is their RE operator. The fraction (1− α) is not fully rational in the sense that
they form expectations by the forecasting model E2t {zt+1} = θE2t {zt} = θ2zt−1,
where the parameter θ governs the nature of the forecast that can either be purely
adaptive (θ < 1) or extrapolative (θ > 1). With regard to aggregate expectations
of endogenous variables it follows that
Êt{xt+1} = αEt{xt+1}+ (1− α)θ2xt−1, (3)
Êt{pit+1} = αEt{pit+1}+ (1− α)θ2pit−1 (4)
holds.
In the subsequent analysis, we will close the model in each subsection with a
different simple monetary policy rule and inspect its dynamic properties in the
resulting system.
Inspection of (3) and (4) reveals that past values of aggregate endogenous
variables can affect the aggregate demand and supply when RE and adaptive
expectations coexist and therefore this model is self-referential. In consequence,
monetary policy rules that perform well in pure RE models may not necessarily
do so under heterogeneous expectations of this particular type.
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2.2. The Method of Numerical Analysis
Our analysis is based on numerical methods. In particular, we calculate and
visualize so-called regions of local determinacy, local indeterminacy and local
explosiveness. These regions are plotted in a plane where the axes measure the
monetary policy parameters. As mentioned before, we choose to do a numerical
analysis as we deal with high dimensional economic systems. These systems do
not always allow to provide analytical conditions under which a certain rule yields
determinacy.
The aforementioned dynamic IS curve and NKPC together with a monetary
policy rule will usually lead to a second-order stochastic difference system of the
form
yt = A Et{yt+1}+ C yt−1, (5)
where yt is a m × 1 vector of endogenous variables and matrices A and C are
m×m matrices. In order to analyse the dynamics of the system (5), one needs
to calculate the eigenvalues, because the eigenvalues characterize the system dy-
namics. One can do so by following a solution procedure for the system (5) that,
as a by-product, yields the eigenvalues of the system.
We may either make use of the solution method detailed in Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) or the more general and robust purely numerical method proposed
by Klein (2000). The advantage of the latter method is that it can cope with
matrices A and C even if they are singular. Therefore, we rely on the latter
method (as outlined in McCallum (2009a, p.13ff.)) for the subsequent analyses.
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We consider solutions to the system (5) of the type
yt = Λyt−1, (6)
where Λ is a m×m matrix. We consider (6) to be the Perceived Law of Motion
(PLM). One period ahead, (6) is given by
Et{yt+1} = Λyt = Λ2yt−1. (7)
Next, we plug (7) into the original system (5). The result is, what is labeled the
Actual Law of Motion (ALM) of the economy
yt = A[Λ
2yt−1] + Cyt−1 = [AΛ2 + C]yt−1. (8)
In a REE, the PLM has to coincide with the ALM. Formally this means that
Λ
!
= [AΛ2 + C] (9)
has to hold.
Obviously, we can augment condition (9) by the matrix identity Λ = Λ and
write the two of them as A 0
0 I

 Λ2
Λ
 =
 I −C
I 0

 Λ
I
 , (10)
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or more compact as
A¯
 Λ2
Λ
 = C¯
 Λ
I
 . (11)
Matrices A¯ and C¯ are of dimension 2m× 2m.
Our ultimate goal are the so-called generalized eigenvalues (GEVs) of C¯ with
respect to A¯ or equivalently the GEVs of the matrix pencil [C¯ − λA¯]. The
approach of Klein (2000) utilizes the Schur generalized decomposition theorem
which states that there exist some unitary 2m× 2m matrices Q and Z such that
we can decompose matrices A¯, C¯ into the upper triangular 2m× 2m matrices T
and S respectively, which is QC¯Z = T and QA¯Z = S respectively.
Furthermore, the GEVs of the matrix pencil [C¯ − λA¯] are defined as the
ratio of the elements of the main diagonal of T to the main diagonal of S, i.e.
λi = tii/sii. For our purposes, we calculate the GEVs for any combination of the
monetary policy parameters. Next, we count the number of GEVs, whose moduli
is inside or outside the unit circle for any combination of the monetary policy
coefficients.
Precisely this information allows us to visualize regions of local determinacy,
local indeterminacy or local explosiveness in the policy space as in Bullard and
Mitra (2002). In particular, at any point in the policy space, where the number of
GEVs whose moduli lie outside the unit circle equals the number of free variables,
there is local determinacy. Next, when the number of GEVs whose moduli lie
outside the unit circle is lower than the number of free variables we have local
indeterminacy of some order.
The order is precisely the number by which the free variables exceed the num-
ber of GEVs whose moduli lie outside the unit circle. Thus, when the difference
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is one, we denote it Order 1 Indeterminacy. This characterizes a situation with
a system exhibiting a one dimensional continuum of stationary equilibria. When
the difference is two, we label that Order 2 Indeterminacy. This denotes a sit-
uation with a system exhibiting a two dimensional continuum of equilibria and
so on. Thereby we indicate “the number of independent sunspots required to
specify the solution”, see Evans and McGough (2005, p.1816).
Finally, in a situation where the number of GEVs whose moduli lie outside
the unit circle is larger than the number of free variables in the system, there is
local explosiveness.12
2.3. The Calibration of the Economy
For our numerical analysis, we need to calibrate our model. We choose values
for the structural parameters according to Table 1 below. A comparison of our
Parameter Value Source
α ∈ {1.00, 0.60} -
β 0.99 -
λ 0.024 Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1114)
σ 0.157 Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1114)
θ ∈ {0.90, 1.10} Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
ϕpi ∈ [0.00, 2.00] Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
ϕx ∈ [0.00, 2.00] Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
ϕi ∈ {0.00, 0.65} Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1188)
Table 1: Calibration of the economy.
choices to the ones of Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1114) and Bullard and Mitra
(2007, p.1182) reveals that these studies provide results for the same values of β,
λ and σ.
Moreover, the two studies cover the same parameter space with regard to the
monetary policy coefficients of the simple rules ϕpi and ϕx in Section 3 below.
12In our analysis we ignore the special case, where one or more moduli of the GEVs
may lie on the unit circle.
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Thus, there is a high degree of comparability of our results with these widely
cited studies. Note that the choice of the monetary policy parameter ϕi is based
on empirical evidence by Sack (1998).
Finally, please recall that our analysis considers expectational heterogeneity.
Therefore we study the coexistence of rational and non-rational agents (α 6= 1.00)
next to the base case of rational agents only (α = 1.00). In the former case the
parameter θ is in action. This parameter characterizes the type of non-rational
expectations.
Please also notice that Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.) we allow for a
higher degree of heterogeneity as we choose α ∈ {1.00, 0.60} in our analysis. This
choice is motivated by the evidence for heterogeneous expectations among agents
in micro data that corresponds to α = 0.60, see Branch (2004).
3. Dynamic Properties with Taylor-type Rules
Herein, we carry out a numerical investigation of the dynamic consequences
of simple monetary policy rules without and with policy inertia. These are linear
rules that condition the central bank’s instrument rate on the rate of inflation
and the output gap which shall reflect the central bank’s mandate. We also
consider policy inertia in the analysis to capture the tendency of central banks
to gradually alter their policy instrument.
3.1. Monetary Policy Rule with Contemporaneous Data
Assume, as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.1.) that the central bank feeds
back to contemporaneous data on inflation and the output gap.13 Such a rule
13Be aware that each simple rule considered herein may have some advantages and
shortcomings with regard to measurement issues etc. that are not related to the dy-
namic properties. For a discussion of these issues, we refer the interested reader to
Bullard and Mitra (2002) or McCallum (1999).
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may be of the functional form
it = ϕpipit + ϕxxt + ϕiit−1. (12)
For the moment, we ignore policy inertia, i.e. we set ϕi = 0.00. We can plug this
version of (12) into (1), combine the latter with (2) and get a system as (5) with
the vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and system matrices
A =
α
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)
 σ 1− βϕpi
σλ λ+ β(σ + ϕx)
 (13)
and
C =
(1− α)θ2
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)
 σ 1− βϕpi
σλ λ+ β(σ + ϕx)
 . (14)
Please be aware that with RE only (α = 1.00) the matrix C is a matrix of
zeros and we are exactly in the case considered by Bullard and Mitra (2002,
p.1115). In consequence, all the analytical proofs therein hold, both, with respect
to determinacy and E-stability.
Now, we compare the case of homogeneous RE (α = 1.00) to the case of het-
erogeneous expectations (α = 0.60), where non-rational expectations are either
purely adaptive (θ = 0.90) or extrapolative (θ = 1.10). Consider the numerical
illustration in Figure 1.14
For the beginning, realize that Panel 1(a) is nothing but an extract of Bullard
14Please note that in all figures below that plot regions the color-code is as follows:
red regions label Order 2 Indeterminacy, blue regions label Order 1 Indeterminacy,
green regions label Determinacy and yellow regions label Local Explosiveness. The
horizontal axis measures the policy coefficient ϕpi and the vertical axis measures the
policy coefficient ϕx.
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 1: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on contemporaneous data.
The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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and Mitra (2002, Fig.1, p.1117) and restates their numerical result with regard to
determinacy. We observe that a large share of the policy space yields determinacy
and the Taylor-principle yields determinacy throughout the parameter space.15
Furthermore, inspection of the differences between Panels 1(c) and 1(e) indi-
cates two results. In case of contemporaneous data in the policy rule, where next
to RE, purely adaptive expectations (θ = 0.90) exist, the Taylor-principle still
yields determinacy in the whole parameter space, whereas this is not true in the
case of extrapolative expectations (θ = 1.10).
Next, the region of determinacy increases relatively to the region of indetermi-
nacy for the case of purely adaptive expectations, whereas the reverse is true for
the case of extrapolative expectations. Put differently, policies that used to lead
to indeterminacy under homogeneous RE yield determinacy in the presence of
purely adaptive expectations and the opposite is true in the presence of extrapola-
tive expectations. This has been observed by Branch and McGough (2009, p.11)
for a forward-looking monetary policy rule (as we will discuss in Section 3.3) and
we can confirm that observation herein for a policy rule with contemporaneous
data.16
Now, consider the case with policy inertia, i.e. ϕi = 0.65 in (12). We can
combine this version of (12) and (1) with (2) and get a system as (5) with the
15Please note that we discuss our results in the light of the Taylor-principle as it
appears to be a quite robust phenomenon that sticking to this principle yields deter-
minacy. But be aware that this principle is not an exact and general condition (see
Bullard and Mitra (2002)).
16Surely it would be of interest to have exact conditions that explain the influence
of α on stability. In this particular case, it requires to study a quartic function and our
current research is concerned exactly with this issue.
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vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′ and matrices
A =
α
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)

σ 1− βϕpi 0
σλ λ+ β(σ + ϕx) 0
σ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) ϕx + ϕpi(λ+ βσ) 0
 (15)
and
C =
1
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)
×
(1− α)θ2σ (1− α)θ2(1− βϕpi) −ϕi
(1− α)θ2σλ (1− α)θ2(λ+ β(σ + ϕx)) −λϕi
(1− α)θ2σ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) (1− α)θ2(ϕx + ϕpi(λ+ βσ)) σϕi
 . (16)
When α = 1.00 we are in the case of homogeneous RE. Numerical results are
presented in the right column of Figure 1. First, compare Panel 1(b) to Panel
1(a), the case without policy inertia. One can observe that in an economy with
homogeneous RE the set of policies {ϕpi, ϕx} that yield determinacy increases.17
This is a result that was also reported by Bullard and Mitra (2007) for policy
rules that we will study in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below. A comparison of Panel
1(d) to Panel 1(c) as well as Panel 1(f) to Panel 1(e) reveals that this pattern of
observation is robust to heterogeneous expectations. It holds independent of the
nature of the expectations of non-rational agents. Moreover, the Taylor-principle
appears to be an appropriate policy recommendation in the case of homogeneous
RE as well as in the case where the non-rational agents have purely adaptive
expectations. Unfortunately this is not generally true, when non-rational agents
17Sensitivity analyses with parameter ϕi suggest that the larger the policy inertia,
the larger the regions of determinacy throughout most of the cases in this study.
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have extrapolative expectations.
3.2. Monetary Policy Rule with Lagged Data
Next we assume, as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.2.) that the central
bank feeds back to lagged data on inflation and the output gap, i.e.
it = ϕpipit−1 + ϕxxt−1 + ϕiit−1. (17)
Notice that for the beginning we ignore policy inertia in the rule and set ϕi = 0.00.
We combine this version of (17) with (1) and (2) in order to get a system as (5)
with the vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and matrices18
A = α
 1 σ−1
λ λσ−1 + β
 (18)
and
C =
 (1− α)θ2 − ϕxσ−1 σ−1[(1− α)θ2 − ϕpi]
λ[(1− α)θ2 − ϕxσ−1] (1− α)θ2β + λσ−1[(1− α)θ2 − ϕpi]
 . (19)
In the case when expectations are completely rational (α = 1.00) matrix C is a
matrix of zeros. Then, we are exactly in the case of Bullard and Mitra (2002,
p.1118) and their results hold.
When we turn to the numerical results in Figure 2, inspection of Panel 2(a)
makes clear that it is just an extract of Bullard and Mitra (2002, Fig.2, p.1120).
18Note that Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.2.) forward (17) by one period and then
combine it with (1) and (2) in order to get a system as (5) with yt = [xt, pit, it]
′ for the
derivation of the set of sufficient conditions and the related formal proof. Our analysis
is purely numerical, and for the sake of simplicity, we eliminate as much variables as
we can. The numerical results appear to be equivalent.
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 2: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on lagged data. The right
column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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We find regions of determinacy, indeterminacy and local explosiveness. In addi-
tion, the Taylor-principle only yields determinacy in case of modest feedback to
output gap deviations.
Next, in Panel 2(c) we observe that when non-rational agents are present and
have purely adaptive expectations (θ = 0.90), both the regions of determinacy
and indeterminacy of order one become smaller and the region of explosiveness
increases. Note from Panel 2(e) that if the non-rational agents have extrapolative
expectations (θ = 1.10), then the reverse is true. The regions of determinacy and
indeterminacy of order one increase but local explosiveness is no longer present.
If we regard local explosiveness as a serious threat, then one cannot conclude
that the presence of purely adaptive expectations is favourable to stability and
the presence of extrapolative expectations is not. Thus, our findings for the rule
with lagged data are at odds with the results in Branch and McGough (2009,
p.11ff.).
Finally, there are two additional observations. First, sticking to the Taylor-
principle is not a good policy in general, as it cannot rule out regions of indeter-
minacy or local explosiveness. Second, a policy that exclusively feeds back to the
output gap (ϕx 6= 0, ϕpi = 0) has the potential to yield determinacy, which is a
rather unusual observation.
Now, we assume that the central bank favours policy inertia, which is similar
to the rule studied in Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.). We set ϕi = 0.65.
This version of rule (17) together with equations (1) and (2) can be written as a
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system (5) with a vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′ and matrices19
A =
1
(ϕx + ϕpiλ− ϕiσ)

−αϕiσ −α(ϕpiβ + ϕi) 1
−αϕiσλ −α[ϕi(σβ + λ)− ϕxβ] λ
ασ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) α[ϕx + ϕpi(σβ + λ)] −σ
 (20)
and
C =
(1− α)θ2
(ϕx + ϕpiλ− ϕiσ)

−ϕiσ −(ϕpiβ + ϕi) 0
−ϕiσλ −[ϕi(σβ + λ)− ϕxβ] 0
σ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) [ϕx + ϕpi(σβ + λ)] 0
 . (21)
Note it is an easy task to verify that for the case of homogeneous RE (α = 1.00),
we are exactly in the case of Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.) and their results
apply.
We present our numerical results in the right column of Figure 2 below. From
comparison of Panel 2(b) to 2(a) it is hard to tell if the region of determinacy
really increases in the case of policy inertia in an economy with homogeneous
RE.20 Furthermore, comparisons of Panel 2(d) to Panel 2(c) as well as Panel
2(f) to Panel 2(e) indicate that policy inertia does not improve the dynamic
properties with regard to determinacy in general. It is only true for the case of
purely adaptive expectations.
In addition, with policy inertia the Taylor-principle is no suitable policy rec-
ommendation for a lagged data rule in general. Sticking to that principle cannot
19As in Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.) we forward the rule by one period, before
we build the system.
20Note that Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.) attribute a beneficial role to policy
inertia as the region that yields both determinate and E-stable outcomes increase with
policy inertia.
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rule out indeterminacy or local explosiveness universally.
3.3. Forward-Looking Monetary Policy Rule
This section basically recapitulates the numerical analysis of Branch and Mc-
Gough (2009, p.11ff.). We do so for completeness on the one hand and on the
other hand because our calibration is slightly different, i.e. α ∈ {1.00, 0.60}. We
choose the latter in order to highlight the fact that heterogeneous expectations
might cause local explosiveness in this specific setting. This is an observation
possibly overlooked by Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.).
Thus, similar as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.3.) or Branch and Mc-
Gough (2009, p.11ff.) we assume that central bank feeds back to RE on period
t+ 1 inflation and the output gap, i.e.
it = ϕpiEt{pit+1}+ ϕxEt{xt+1}+ ϕiit−1. (22)
One could also think of the expectations in the rule (22) as the central bank’s
forecast of the aggregate variables based on its period t information set. For the
time being, we assume that there is no policy inertia, i.e. ϕi = 0 .
We recast (22), (1) and (2) as our standardform (5) with a vector yt = [xt, pit]
′
and matrices
A =
 α− σ−1ϕx σ−1(α− ϕpi)
λ(α− σ−1ϕx) αβ + λσ−1(α− ϕpi)
 (23)
and
C = (1− α)θ2
 1 σ−1
λ (β + λσ−1)
 . (24)
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Note that for the case of RE only (α = 1.00) the matrix C is a matrix of zeros.
In this case all the analytical proofs with respect to determinacy and E-stability
in Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1121) hold.
Next, consider the visualization of numerical results in Figure 3 below. Panel
3(a) is an exact reproduction of “north-west” panel in Branch and McGough
(2009, Fig.1, p.12) which is an extract of Bullard and Mitra (2002, Fig.3, p.1123).
The difference is that in the latter study, there is no distinction between indeter-
minacy of different orders and for that reason labels in Panel 1(a) are different
compared to the latter.21
In Panel 1(a) we observe regions of indeterminacy of order 1 and order 2 next
to regions of determinacy. In addition, it is obvious that the Taylor-principle
does not hold in general, but only for modest feedback to output gap deviations.
Next, Panels 3(c) and 3(e) make clear that in presence of heterogeneous
agents, regions of explosiveness may arise. Interestingly, these regions seem to
originate and expand from an area around (ϕpi ≈ 1, ϕx = 0) with decreasing α,
the fraction of non-rational agents. As a consequence, sticking too close to the
Taylor-principle under this rule might turn out to be a rather dangerous policy in
an economy with heterogeneous expectations. As a matter of fact, such a policy
could trigger explosive paths of the price level under the rule (22) without policy
inertia.
Our findings for this particular rule make clear that the results in Branch and
McGough (2009, p.11ff.) are heavily dependent on the fraction of non-rational
21If one compares the two figures Branch and McGough (2009, Fig.1, p.12) and
Bullard and Mitra (2002, Fig.3, p.1123), one realizes that regions of indeterminacy of
order one, are found to be E-stable and regions of indeterminacy of order two, are
found to be E-unstable by Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1121ff.). From our perspective,
it would be interesting to examine, whether or not there is a link between the concepts
of E-stability and indeterminacy of some order.
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agents. For our choice of expectational heterogeneity (α = 0.60) explosive re-
gions emerge for both the case of purely adaptive expectations and the case of
extrapolative expectations. Therefore, one cannot claim that the former type
of adaptive expectations may improve the dynamic properties with regard to
determinacy in general, whereas for the latter type the opposite is true.
Finally, note from Panel 3(c) that in the presence of purely adaptive expec-
tations policies that solely feed back to output gap deviations (ϕx 6= 0, ϕpi = 0)
again have the potential to yield determinacy.
Let us get back to rule (22) and assume that central bank attaches importance
to policy inertia as in Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1184ff.). Then the system to
analyze (5) has matrices
A =

α− σ−1ϕx σ−1(α− ϕpi) 0
λ(α− σ−1ϕx) αβ + λσ−1(α− ϕpi) 0
ϕx ϕpi 0
 (25)
and
C =

(1− α)θ2 (1− α)θ2σ−1 −ϕiσ−1
(1− α)θ2λ (1− α)θ2(β + λσ−1) −ϕiσ−1λ
0 0 ϕi
 (26)
corresponding to a vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′.
If there are only fully rational agents (α = 1.00), we are exactly in the case
of Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1184ff.). Hence their results with respect to deter-
minacy and E-stability hold. The numerical results are illustrated in the right
column of Figure 3.
By comparing Panel 3(b) to Panel 3(a) we find that in the case of homogeneous
23
(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 3: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on expectations of period
t+ 1 values. The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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RE the region of determinacy increases. This pattern remains stable for the
case of heterogeneous expectations, independent of the nature of expectations of
non-rational agents as Panels 3(d) and 3(f) reveal. Most notably, policy inertia
eliminates regions of local explosiveness in the case of heterogeneous expectations.
Moreover, the Taylor-principle does not hold in general as in the case without
policy inertia.
A priori, it is not clear, why the central bank should feedback to RE of
aggregate variables. It may simply do so, because it assumes a pure RE model
of the economy. Alternatively, as Branch and McGough (2009, p.9) propose, one
could assume that the central bank is aware of the exact nature of heterogeneous
expectations and conditions its instrument on these expectations, which is
it = ϕpiÊt{pit+1}+ ϕxÊt{xt+1}+ ϕiit−1. (27)
From our perspective, this appears to be a strong assumption in practice. We
presume that tracking the exact shares α of agents with different types of ex-
pectations demands a non-negligible effort from central banks. Moreover, the
central bank needs to determine the nature of adaptive expectations θ. This may
come at large information costs. Nevertheless, it is of interest, whether or not
the potential benefit of such a rule could justify the costs.
As before, we start with rule (27) without considering policy inertia (ϕi = 0).
This leads to a system with a vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and matrices
A = α
 1− σ−1ϕx σ−1(1− ϕpi)
λ(1− σ−1ϕx) β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi)
 (28)
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and
C = (1− α)θ2
 1− σ−1ϕx σ−1(1− ϕpi)
λ(1− σ−1ϕx) β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi)
 . (29)
Obviously we end up in the case of Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1121) if we set
α = 1.00. In this case, all the analytical proofs with respect to determinacy and
E-stability therein hold.
Our numerical results are outlined in the left column of Figure 4 below. Panel
4(a) does coincide with Panel 3(a) by construction. But how do things change
once expectational heterogeneity is in place? We observe that the locally explo-
sive regions in Panels 3(c) and 3(e) are not longer present in Panels 4(c) and Panel
4(e). Thus, it is evident that when the central bank makes use of a monetary
policy rule featuring feedback on heterogeneous expectations, it may at least be
able to rule out explosive paths of nominal variables. With regard to indetermi-
nacy the results for rules (22) and (27) appear to be observationally equivalent
in the absence of policy inertia.
Now, we may again ask how policy inertia in rule (27) affects the dynamics.
Then, the system (5) with vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′ has matrices
A = α

1− σ−1ϕx σ−1(1− ϕpi) 0
λ(1− σ−1ϕx) β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi) 0
ϕx ϕpi 0
 (30)
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and
C =

(1− α)θ2(1− σ−1ϕx) (1− α)θ2σ−1(1− ϕpi) −ϕiσ−1
(1− α)θ2[λ(1− σ−1ϕx)] (1− α)θ2[β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi)] −ϕiσ−1λ
(1− α)θ2ϕx (1− α)θ2ϕpi ϕi
 .(31)
Results are displayed in the right column of Figure 4. Panels 4(b), 4(d) and
4(f) reveal that at least qualitatively the results do no change compared to the
situation, where the central bank is not aware of expectational heterogeneity.
The results in this subsection suggest that if a forward-looking rule is in place
there are two ways of ruling out local explosiveness. One way is to track the
exact nature of expectations as is done by rule (27). The second way is to simply
add policy inertia to rule (22). The latter option is less costly with regard to
information and may therefore be preferred by central banks that implement a
forward-looking instrument rule. This is de facto another merit of policy inertia.
3.4. Monetary Policy Rule with Contemporaneous Expectations
The last simple rule we are going to consider is the one in which the central
bank feeds back to contemporaneous expectations on inflation and the output
gap as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.4.), i.e.
it = ϕpiEt{pit}+ ϕxEt{xt}+ ϕiit−1. (32)
One can motivate such a rule by the fact that real time data of aggregate variables
usually are not available for central bankers or only with high imprecision. Thus,
it may be far more realistic to assume that the policy makers feed back to their
RE forecast of period t variables, rather than actual contemporaneous data.
In such a situation, the information set of the central bank contains observa-
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 4: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on heterogeneous expectations
of period t+ 1 values. The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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tions up to period t − 1. In order to ensure symmetry in information sets, we
follow Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.4.) and assume that policy makers as well
as agents in the economy form expectations with an information set as of period
t−1.22 Otherwise private sector agents would observe more data then the central
bank. Thus, our economy now evolves according to
xt = Êt−1{xt+1} − σ−1
(
it − Êt−1{pit+1}
)
(33)
and
pit = βÊt−1{pit+1}+ λxt. (34)
The average expectations of aggregate variables are now given by
Êt−1{xt+1} = αEt−1{xt+1}+ (1− α)θ2xt−1 (35)
Êt−1{pit+1} = αEt−1{pit+1}+ (1− α)θ2pit−1 (36)
instead of (3) and (4). Finally, (32) is transformed to
it = ϕpiEt−1{pit}+ ϕxEt−1{xt}+ ϕiit−1. (37)
We can rewrite the resulting system (33)-(37) as
A0 st = A1 Et−1{st}+ A2 Et−1{st+1}+ A3 st−1, (38)
22From our understanding the assumptions in Branch and McGough (2009, sec. 2.1.)
are general enough to allow for a change in the timing of expectations.
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where st = [xt, pit]
′ is a p× 1 vector and matrices are given by
A0 =
 1 0
−λ 1
 , A1 =
 −ϕxσ−1 −ϕpiσ−1
0 0
 , A2 =
 α σ−1α
0 βα

and
A3 =
 (1− α)θ2 σ−1(1− α)θ2
0 β(1− α)θ2
 .
The system (38) does not directly match our standard form (5). Nevertheless, we
can utilize the approach of Binder and Pesaran (1999, p.140ff.) as (38) matches
their general multivariate structural RE model
n1∑
i=0
n2∑
j=0
Mij E(st+j−i|Ωt−i) = 0, (39)
where the matrices Mij are of dimension p × p and the vectors st+j−i are of
dimension p × 1. Ωt−i denotes the non-decreasing information set. In our case,
it is convenient to consider two lags n1 = 2 and two leads n2 = 2, thus
0 = M00 st + M01 Et{st+1}+ M02 Et{st+2}+ M10 st−1 + M20 st−2
+M11 Et−1{st}+ M21 Et−2{st−1}
+M12 Et−1{st+1}+ M22 Et−2{st}. (40)
Note that M00 = −A0, M10 = A3, M11 = A1, M12 = A2 and 02 = M01 =
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M02 = M20 = M21 = M22. Next, we can recast the latter expression as
0 =

M00 M01 M02
0 I 0
0 0 I


st
Etst+1
Etst+2
+

M10 M11 M12
0 0 0
0 0 0


st−1
Et−1st
Et−1st+1

+

M20 M21 M22
0 0 0
0 0 0


st−2
Et−2st−1
Et−2st
+

0 0 0
−I 0 0
0 −I 0


Etst+1
Etst+2
Etst+3

or with zt = [s
′
t, Ets
′
t+1, Ets
′
t+2]
′ more compact as
0 = Γ0 zt + Γ1 zt−1 + Γ2 zt−2 + Γ−1 Etzt+1. (41)
Now, we can rewrite equation (41) as
0 =
 Γ0 Γ1
0 I

 zt
zt−1
+
 0 Γ2
−I 0

 zt−1
zt−2
+
 Γ−1 0
0 0

 Etzt+1
zt
 ,
or by defining yt = [z
′
t, z
′
t−1]
′ more compactly as a second-order stochastic differ-
ence system, which in general can be written as
Λ0 yt = −Λ−1 Et{yt+1} −Λ1 yt−1
yt = −Λ−10 Λ−1 Et{yt+1} −Λ−10 Λ1 yt−1
yt = A Et{yt+1}+ C yt−1. (42)
This is the same as our standard form (5).23
23Λ0 is non-singular and invertible as matrices Γ0 and A0 are non-singular. We omit
matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 12× 12 in this case.
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The numerical results appear to be observationally similar to the left column
of Figure 1 above for the rule with contemporaneous actual data (12). Loosely
speaking, it has desirable properties with regard to determinacy under heteroge-
neous expectations.24
This is good news for the central bank. The interest rate rule depending
on contemporaneous expectations (32) does only require data up to period t −
1, as mentioned above. Therefore, it is easier to implement compared to the
contemporaneous data rule (12) and still yields similar results. Consequently, rule
(32) is preferable to rule (12) even in an economy of heterogeneous expectations
and not only in an economy of homogeneous RE as argued by Bullard and Mitra
(2002, p.1108).
Next, we would like to consider the effect of policy inertia in rule (32), i.e.
ϕi = 0.65. Similar steps as detailed above yield a system
A0 st = A1 Et−1{st}+ A2 Et−1{st+1}+ A3 st−1, (43)
where st = [xt, pit, it]
′ and matrices are given by
A0 =

1 0 σ−1
−λ 1 0
0 0 1
 , A1 =

0 0 0
0 0 0
ϕx ϕpi 0
 , A2 =

α σ−1α 0
0 βα 0
0 0 0

24For the analysis we may also replace expected values by their actual counterparts
in (38) as is done by Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1123ff.). We understand the latter
approach as a kind of shortcut. Then it is easy to verify that the matrices for the case of
contemporaneous data rule and contemporaneous expectations rule coincide and that
for α = 1 we are in the same case as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1123ff.). Then
all the analytical proofs with respect to determinacy and E-stability therein hold. We
choose to analyze the system in a rigorous way as we are not aware of the argument
behind “shortcut” of Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1123ff.).
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and
A3 =

(1− α)θ2 σ−1(1− α)θ2 0
0 β(1− α)θ2 0
0 0 ϕi
 .
Once more we make use of (39) and the subsequent steps outlined above to bring
the system (43) into our standard form (5).25 We find that the numerical results
are the same as in the right column of Figure 4 for the contemporaneous data rule.
Nevertheless, once more we would like to emphasize that the contemporaneous
expectations rule (32) is preferable compared to the contemporaneous data rule
(12) as it is operational.
Next, one could again assume that the central bank is aware of the hetero-
geneous expectations as in Section 3.3 above. Then the central bank sets the
nominal interest rate not according to (32) but according to
it = ϕpiÊt−1{pit}+ ϕxÊt−1{xt}+ ϕiit−1. (44)
Also note that, given the assumptions in Branch and McGough (2009, p.3), we
have
Êt−1{xt} = αEt−1{xt}+ (1− α)θxt−1, (45)
Êt−1{pit} = αEt−1{pit}+ (1− α)θpit−1. (46)
For the moment, we omit policy inertia, i.e. ϕi = 0. We can rewrite the system
25Again we omit matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 18 × 18 in this
case.
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(33)-(36) and (44)-(46) as
A0 st = A1 Et−1{st}+ A2 Et−1{st+1}+ A3 st−1, (47)
where the vector of variables is st = [xt, pit]
′ and the system matrices are given
by
A0 =
 1 0
−λ 1
 , A1 =
 −ϕxσ−1α −ϕpiσ−1α
0 0
 , A2 =
 α σ−1α
0 βα

and
A3 =
 (1− α)θ(θ − ϕxσ−1) σ−1(1− α)θ(θ − ϕx)
0 β(1− α)θ2
 .
Again we use the general form (39) and the subsequent steps outlined above to
bring the system into our standard form (5).26
The numerical results are illustrated in the left column of Figure 5. It appears
that the numerical results look similar to the ones for the contemporaneous data
rule in Figure 1 in Section 3.1 above. Therefore, they are also observationally
similar to the results for the contemporaneous expectations rule (37) with feed-
back to homogeneous RE. This makes clear that it does not make a difference
whether or not the central bank is aware of expectational heterogeneity in case
of the contemporaneous expectations rule. This is true at least for the parameter
space considered herein.
Finally, we study the impact of policy inertia in rule (44) on the dynamics,
i.e. ϕi = 0.65. With assumptions (45)-(46) we can derive a system similar to
26Again we omit matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 12× 12.
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(43) with matrices
A0 =

1 0 σ−1
−λ 1 0
0 0 1
 , A1 =

0 0 0
0 0 0
ϕxα ϕpiα 0
 , A2 =

α σ−1α 0
0 βα 0
0 0 0

and
A3 =

(1− α)θ2 σ−1(1− α)θ2 0
0 β(1− α)θ2 0
ϕx(1− α)θ ϕpi(1− α)θ ϕi
 .
Again we can bring this version of (43) into our standard form (5).27
The numerical results are illustrated in the right column of Figure 5. It
appears that the numerical results look similar to the ones obtained for the con-
temporaneous data rule (12) above. Therefore, they are also similar to the results
for the rule (37) with policy inertia.
Thus, for the rule that depends on contemporaneous expectations, it does
not make a qualitative difference whether the central bank tracks heterogeneous
expectations or not.
Furthermore, these results again indicate that in an economy with expec-
tational heterogeneity the central bank can still choose a rule that is easier to
implement, i.e. the rule that depends on contemporaneous expectations. It will
not encounter a disadvantage with regard to determinacy compared to the rule
that depends on contemporaneous data.
27Once more we omit matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 18 × 18 in
this case.
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 5: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on heterogeneous expectations
of period t values. The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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4. Conclusion
In our analysis of Taylor-type rules, we find that in an economy with heteroge-
neous expectations the contemporaneous expectations rule is more desirable than
other often discussed rules. This is due to the fact that this policy prescription
rules out explosiveness and does not require to track individuals’ expectations.
Furthermore, under this rule the Taylor-principle holds for a large share of the
parameter space. If there is a moderate feedback to the output gap, it can hold
in general.
Moreover, this paper also demonstrates that in case of a forward-looking rule
that feeds back on purely RE, the economy may exhibit regions of local explo-
siveness depending on the degree of expectational heterogeneity. Interestingly
these regions occur in the area, in which the central bank would fight inflation
expectations moderately by more than one-for-one, i.e. sticking to the Taylor-
principle. This is a new level of destabilization compared to what is known in the
literature. Once the central bank is aware of the nature of expectations in the
economy and feeds back to heterogeneous expectations, it is able to rule out local
explosiveness. More generally, our analysis illustrates that rules that depend on
forecasts can be improved by tracking the nature of expectations and applying
this information to the central banks forecast.
Most importantly, policy inertia can improve the properties of the rules. We
observe for almost all rules that with an increasing level of policy inertia the
regions of determinacy appear to increase at the expense of regions of local in-
determinacy and explosiveness. This holds no matter whether expectations in
the economy are homogeneous RE or heterogeneous. Overall, this confirms the
findings of Bullard and Mitra (2007) in the case of heterogeneous expectations.
Policy inertia is a merit of simple monetary policy rules.
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Policy recommendations in the light of our results are as follows. A central
bank that prefers a simple rule may conduct monetary policy by a rule that de-
pends on contemporaneous expectations with policy inertia. Furthermore, it may
stick to the Taylor-principle in the sense that it feeds back to contemporaneous
inflation expectations more than one-for-one combine this stance with moderate
feedback to contemporaneous expectations about the output gap. A reasonable
degree of policy inertia may then ensure stable prices.
This analysis focused on the set-up with coexistence of two types of expecta-
tions formation. Clearly, one may study a NK model with heterogeneous expecta-
tions that allows for coexistence for three or more different types of expectations.
Such a study may serve to robustify our findings.
Alternatively, replacing one of the types of expectations considered herein
could serve the purpose of a higher degree of robustness in a similar way. Branch
and McGough (2009, p.14) mention this idea.
Future research may also aim to study Taylor rules in larger scale versions
(e.g. capital accumulation or monetary and fiscal policy interactions) of the NK
model with heterogeneous expectations.
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